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INTRODUCTION
Congratulations on your decision to acquire an asteroid! As
you probably know, asteroids are rocky celestial bodies that
travel the solar system in elliptical orbits around the Sun.1 Some
asteroids are very small rocks, while others are huge bodies
almost one thousand kilometers in diameter. 2 Most asteroids
remain in the Main Asteroid Belt between the orbits of Jupiter
and Mars, while others wander the solar system in their own
unique orbits.3
This Note will analyze your legal right to acquire an
asteroid and its resources. As we will explain, that right depends
1 . By “celestial body,” this Note refers to objects originating in space, in
accordance with the ancient distinction between such objects and those originating on
Earth. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 15:40 (“There are also heavenly bodies and there are
earthly bodies; but the splendor of the heavenly bodies is one kind, and the splendor of
the earthly bodies is another.”). However, “celestial body” lacks a firm definition in law.
See e.g., FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 175 n.2 (2009)
(describing the absence of a definition of “celestial body” in several treaties that use
the term); see also Asteroids: Read More, NASA, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/
profile.cfm?Object=Asteroids&Display=OverviewLong [hereinafter NASA, Asteroids]
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (describing asteroid orbits around the Sun); Near Earth
Asteroids, INT’L ASTRONOMICAL UNION (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.iau.org/
public/nea/ [hereinafter IAU] (describing asteroids as celestial bodies).
2. See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1 (describing asteroids as ranging in size from
952 kilometers to less than 1 kilometer in diameter); see also IAU, supra note 1
(estimating that 15,000 Near Earth Asteroids (“NEAs”) have a diameter of less that 140
meters). This Note expresses all measurements in metric units out of respect to the
employees of National Aeronautic and Space Administration (“NASA”) who lost their
Mars Climate Orbiter in 1999 because a contractor calibrated the measurements for a
key spacecraft operation in feet instead of meters. See Robin Lloyd, Metric Mishap
Caused Loss of NASA Orbiter, CNN (Sep. 30, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/TECH/space/
9909/30/mars.metric.02/; Mars Mission’s Metric Mixup, WIRED (Sept. 30, 1999),
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/1999/09/31631 (describing the loss
of the Mars Climate Orbiter due to confusion of imperial and metric units).
3. See CAROLYN CROW, THE MAIN ASTEROID BELT 1 (2009) (explaining that the
Main Asteroid Belt lies between the Mars and Jupiter orbits); see also NASA, Asteroids,
supra note 1 (explaining that most asteroids orbit the Sun between Jupiter and Mars).
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on whether anyone can own or use celestial resources.
International law might recognize the claim of whichever
person, natural or corporate, first acquires resources in space.
Alternatively, the law might recognize some Earth-based
authority’s sovereignty over celestial bodies, and allow that
authority to govern the resources of the universe.
The right to acquire property in space is not a strictly
academic concept. In fact, it has staggering economic potential.4
There are more than 500,000 known asteroids in Earth’s solar
system, and many more await discovery.5 Some asteroids contain
precious metals such as gold, platinum, and palladium—so
much of these, in fact, that an asteroid mining venture could
turn a profit by doing nothing more than delivering precious
metals to Earth. 6 Of course, asteroid prospectors might also
diversify their businesses by distributing other asteroid
resources. 7 These include construction staples like iron and
nickel, semiconductor components like silicon and aluminum,
and fertilizer ingredients like nitrogen and ammonia.8 The most
4. See SHANE D. ROSS, NEAR-EARTH ASTEROID MINING 4 (2001), available at http://
www2.esm.vt.edu/~sdross/papers/ross-asteroid-mining-2001.pdf
(describing
how
chemical analysis of meteorites and spectral analysis of asteroid-reflected light indicate
the presence of gold, platinum, and palladium and other metals); see also NASA,
Asteroids, supra note 1 (asserting that there are more than 500,000 known asteroids in
the solar system, and probably many more still yet to be discovered).
5 . See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1; IAU MINOR PLANET CENTER,
http://www.minorplanetcenter.net/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how the
International Astronomical Union’s (“IAU”) Minor Planet Center at the Smithsonian
Astrophysical Observatory has identified the orbits of more than 600,000 celestial
bodies, otherwise known as “minor planets”).
6. See JOHN BROPHY ET AL., KECK INST. SPACE STUDIES, ASTEROID RETRIEVAL
FEASIBILITY STUDY 12 (2012) (asserting that an asteroid mission could expect to
retrieve platinum group metals through chemical or physical processing); see also
Kenneth Chang, In Pursuit of Riches, and Travelers’ Supplies, in the Asteroid Belt, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012, at D3 (asserting that a single spacecraft need not recover a large
amount of platinum to turn a profit); ROSS, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that chemical
analysis of meteorites and spectral analysis of asteroid-reflected light indicate the
presence of gold, platinum, and palladium and other metals).
7. See Michael Belfiore, How to Mine an Asteroid, 189 POPULAR MECHS. 8, 53–55
(2012) (describing various uses of asteroid resources other than precious metals);
Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (describing various uses of non-precious-metal resources);
ROSS, supra note 4, at 6 (asserting that asteroid miners could also provide
semiconductor materials for the photovoltaic solar panel industry).
8. See Brian O’Leary, Mining the Apollo and Amor Asteroids, 197 SCI. 363, 363–64
(1977) (explaining that optical studies suggest some asteroids contain large quantities
of iron and nickel, and chemical analysis of meteorites and lunar samples indicates the
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useful asteroid resource may be the least conspicuous: ice, which
could supply water for spacecraft life support.9 Hydrolysis could
convert asteroid water into hydrogen and oxygen, which are
valuable as fuel and breathable air.10 Asteroids may also provide
other materials to shield spacecraft from cosmic radiation,
which currently makes deep space exploration too dangerous
for humans.11
Most asteroids orbit far from Earth—much farther than
Earth’s Moon and other planets like Mars.12 Nevertheless, the
physical characteristics of space travel make some asteroids less
costly to reach.13 Large celestial bodies like the Moon and Mars

presence of silicates, aluminum, nitrogen); Belfiore, supra note 7, at 55 (asserting that
asteroid nitrogen and ammonia could provide valuable fertilizer); ROSS, supra note 4,
at 1–4 (explaining that chemical and spectral analysis indicate the presence of iron,
nickel, silicon, aluminum, nitrogen, and ammonia).
9. See Belfiore, supra note 7, at 53 (explaining that carbonaceous chondrite
asteroids are a good source of water, which could be cheaper to harvest in space than
to launch from Earth); O’Leary, supra note 8, at 364 (explaining that chemical analysis
of carbonaceous chondrite meteors indicates the presence of water); ROSS, supra note
4, at 4, 8 (explaining that about half of NEAs (by mass) are water-rich carbonaceous
asteroids, which could provide water for life support).
10. See Belfiore, supra note 7, at 53 (describing how hydrogen and oxygen could
provide fuel); see also ROSS, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that hydrogen and oxygen
from asteroids could provide propellant and life support).
11. See Rachel Kaufman, Astronauts Could Ride Asteroids to Mars, Study Says, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 10, 2011), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/
110210-mars-trip-asteroids-taxi-cosmic-rays-hitchhikers-space-science/
(describing
physicist Gregory Matloff’s study published in Acta Astronautica, which argued that
asteroids themselves can serve as vehicles to protect humans from galactic cosmic rays
while transporting them through deep space); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 7
(explaining that asteroid materials could provide necessary shielding to protect
humans from dangerous cosmic rays in deep space).
12. See CROW, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that the Main Asteroid belt, with its
innermost limit at 2.12 Astronomical Units (“AU”) from the sun, is more than twice as
far from the sun as Earth, which orbits at an average of 1 AU); see also Earth’s Moon:
Facts & Figures, NASA, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/profile.cfm?Display=
Facts&Object=Moon (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter NASA, Earth’s Moon]
(explaining that the Moon’s average distance from Earth is 384,400 kilometers); Mars
Fact Sheet, NASA, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/factsheet/marsfact.html (last
visited Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter NASA, Mars Fact Sheet] (explaining that Mars’
minimum distance from earth is 55.7 million kilometers).
13. See MICHAEL A. SEEDS & DANA E. BACKMAN, THE SOLAR SYSTEM 83 (2010)
(explaining that escape velocity depends upon the mass and radius of the celestial body
from which an object seeks to escape); see also Ceres: Facts & Figures, NASA,
http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/profile.cfm?Object=Dwa_Ceres&Display=
Facts&System=Metric (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter NASA, Ceres] (explaining
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exert strong gravity, which would require a spacecraft on the
surface to generate more thrust to reach “escape velocity”
during liftoff.14 Asteroids, on the other hand, are smaller, have
weaker gravity, and thus require much less energy to escape.15 In
fact, a spacecraft’s encounter with most asteroids would be more
like the docking and departure of a seagoing ship than the
landing and takeoff of an aircraft.16 Asteroids are therefore costeffective destinations for round-trip missions.17
One space probe from Earth has already landed on an
asteroid, recovered a small sample of its surface material, and
returned it to Earth.18 The probe was called Hayabusa, and the
Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency used it to collect small
particles on an asteroid named 25413 Itokawa in 2005.19 After
Hayabusa gathered its samples, it separated from the asteroid,
propelled itself back to Earth, and landed in Southern Australia
in 2010.20 Previously, in 2001, a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (“NASA”) probe traveled to asteroid 433 Eros,
where it conducted analysis of the asteroid and transmitted its
findings to Earth.21 NASA believes that by 2025 it will be possible
that Ceres, the largest known asteroid, has an escape velocity of less than 0.64
kilometers, per second (“km/s”)).
14. NASA, Earth’s Moon, supra note 12; NASA, Mars Fact Sheet, supra note 12; SEEDS
& BACKMAN, supra note 13, at 141, 157 (explaining that the Moon’s escape velocity is
2.438 km/s and Mars’s escape velocity is 5.03 km/s).
15. See NASA, Ceres, supra note 13 (explaining that Ceres has an escape velocity of
less than 0.64 km/s); see also SEEDS & BACKMAN, supra note 13, at 559 (comparing
Ceres’s size to Earth’s Moon).
16. See Belfiore, supra note 7, at 52 (asserting that Spacecraft would dock with, not
land upon, a small asteroid without appreciable gravity); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at
36 (discussing possible methods of anchoring to an asteroid to maintain contact with
it).
17 . See Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
asteroids/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (explaining that Asteroids’ low gravity makes
departure easier).
18. Ker Than, Hayabusa Spacecraft Returns with Fiery Show, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(June 14, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/06/100614-sciencespace-asteroids-hayabusa-return-fiery/ (describing how the Hayabusa capsule returned
from an asteroid and landed in Australia on June 13, 2010); Hisayoshi Yurimoto et al.,
Oxygen Isotopic Compositions of Asteroidal Materials Returned from Itokawa by the Hayabusa
Mission, 333 SCIENCE 1116, 1116 (2011) (describing study of materials that Hayabusa
retrieved from asteroid 25143 Itokawa in June 2010).
19. Yurimoto et. al., supra note 18, at 1116.
20. See id.
21 . See NEAR Shoemaker, NASA, http://science.nasa.gov/missions/near/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2013) (describing how the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (“NEAR”)
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to seize control of a 500,000 kilogram asteroid and tow the
entire body back to Earth.22
Besides the financial incentives for operators and investors,
asteroid exploration could promote advances in science and
engineering for all mankind. 23 Asteroid research could help
astronomers better understand the history of the solar system
and the origins of life.24 Prospectors’ efforts to reach and exploit
asteroids could also facilitate engineering progress.25 SpaceDev
Corporation, which unsuccessfully attempted to build asteroid
mining craft in the early 2000s, managed to develop the rocket
motors that now power the private space vessel SpaceShipOne.26
Autonomous missions to asteroids would require advances in
navigation and electrolysis technology that could facilitate future
manned missions in deep space. 27 The technology that
Shoemaker probe achieved a soft landing on asteroid 433 Eros); see also Press Release,
Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., NEAR Shoemaker’s Historic Landing on
Eros Exceeds Science, Engineering Expectations (Feb. 14, 2001), http://
www.jhuapl.edu/newscenter/pressreleases/2001/010214.asp.
22. See Jeff Hecht, NASA Mulls Plan to Drag Asteroid into Moon’s Orbit, NEW
SCIENTIST (Jan. 2, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23039-nasamulls-plan-to-drag-asteroid-into-moons-orbit.html (reporting that the National
Aeronautic and Space Association (“NASA”) is considering a US$2.6 billion mission to
capture an asteroid and drag it into the Moon’s orbit); see also BROPHY ET AL., supra
note 6, at 5 (describing how a study indicates it would be feasible to return a 500,000
kilogram asteroid to an orbit in vicinity of the Moon by 2025).
23. See BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 11–12 (describing anticipated progress in
space science and engineering related to asteroid missions).
24. See Irene Klotz, Asteroid Mission to Look for Seeds of Life, DISCOVERY NEWS (Sept.
27, 2012), http://news.discovery.com/earth/asteroid-sample-mission-120927.html
(describing how Japanese scientists intend to study asteroid material to learn about the
history of the early Solar System); Dawn at a Glance, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/
mission_pages/dawn/mission/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (describing how
NASA intends to study two asteroids in order to learn about the history of the early
solar system and the evolution of celestial bodies).
25. See Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (reporting that SpaceDev failed to launch an
asteroid expedition but succeeded in developing rockets for Virgin Galactic and
SpaceShipOne); ROSS, supra note 4, at 6 (describing SpaceDev’s asteroid prospecting
plans as of 2001); Propulsion Systems, SIERRA NEVADA CORP., http://www.spacedev.com/
ss_propulsion.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how Sierra Nevada
Corporation’s hybrid rocket motors powered SpaceShipOne); Press Release, Sierra
Nevada Corp., Virgin Galactic Joins in Sierra Nevada Space Systems’ Dream Chaser
Orbital Space Vehicle Program (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.sncorp.com/press_more_
info.php?id=433 (reporting that Virgin Galactic will support global sales and marketing
of the Sierra Nevada Corporation’s Dream Chaser Orbital Space Vehicle).
26. See Chang, supra note 6, at D3.
27. See Press Release, Dwayne C. Brown, NASA, NASA to Launch New Science
Mission to Asteroid in 2016 (May 25, 2011), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/
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prospectors use to control asteroids might later help deflect
dangerous asteroids from heading toward Earth, which means
prospecting technology could literally save this planet.28 At the
very least, prospectors’ telescopes would increase humanity’s
chance of detecting an incoming asteroid. 29 As the surprise
explosion over Russia on January 15, 2013 made clear, the
danger of undetected asteroids remains significant.30
Commercial space activity is no longer a matter of science
fiction. The space industry already includes fully operational
companies like SpaceX, which brings customers’ payloads up to
Earth orbit, and as-yet-unrealized ventures like Moon Express,
which plans to mine resources on the Moon.31 Mars One, a nonprofit organization working to establish a colony on Mars, is one
of many enterprises attempting to follow their lead.32 If you plan
2011/may/HQ_11-163_New_Frontier.txt (asserting that a robotic mission to an
asteroid will “pave the way” for future human missions in deep space); Asteroid Usage,
PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/asteroids/usage/ (last
visited Jan. 9, 2013) (asserting that various uses of space water can accelerate the
progress of human spaceflight); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 12 (describing
hypothetical use of electrolysis in space).
28 . See Paul Marks, Asteroid Miners Want to Turn Rocks into Spacecrafts, NEW
SCIENTIST (London), Aug. 2012, at 28, 30 (reporting Planetary Resources co-chairman
Eric Anderson’s assertion that learning how to control asteroids is necessary for the
future safety of the Earth); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 11–12 (asserting that
processes developed to control and maneuver asteroids would directly contribute to
planetary defense).
29. Press Release, Peter H. Diamandis & Eric C. Anderson, Planetary Resources,
Future Asteroid Mining Industry Will Provide Capability to Aid the Deflection
of Potentially Hazardous Objects Near Earth (Feb. 14, 2013), http://
www.planetaryresources.com/2013/02/future-asteroid-mining-industry-will-providecapability-to-aid-the-deflection-of-potentially-hazardous-objects-near-earth/ (asserting
that asteroid mining technology could help detect potentially dangerous asteroids).
30. See Andrey Kuzmin, Meteorite Explodes over Russia, More than 1,000 Injured,
REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/15/us-russiameteorite-idUSBRE91E05Z20130215; see also Monte Morin, Russian Meteor Not Related to
2012 DA14, Scientists Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, at 3 (reporting that while
astronomers were tracking the close approach of one asteroid to Earth, another
asteroid approached from another direction and remained unnoticed until it exploded
over Russia).
31 . See Missions, MOON EXPRESS, http://www.moonexpress.com/missions.html
(last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (describing Moon Express’s intention to use of Moon
resources commercially); Company Overview, SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/
company.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how SpaceX provides space
launch services).
32. See Christina Chaey, Mars One Has Officially Raised “Millions” To Build the Red
Planet’s First Human Colony, FAST CO. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.fastcompany.com/
3005255/fast-feed/mars-one-has-officially-raised-millions-build-red-planets-first-human-
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to acquire resources beyond Earth’s atmosphere, your most
significant competitor is probably Planetary Resources, an
American asteroid mining company based in the State of
Washington.33 Planetary Resources intends to deliver asteroid
products to customers on Earth and in space.34 The company is
currently building satellite telescopes to identify asteroids for
mining, and the bona fides of its leaders and employees indicate
that it is serious. 35 Company president Chris Lewicki, for
example, was the flight director for two NASA Mars rover
missions.36 He leads more than thirty engineers from NASA’s Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, and his financial backers include two
former chief executives of Google.37
The technological and economic hurdles between private
companies and asteroids are daunting, but would-be prospectors
also face potential legal challenges. Scholars have suggested that
the United Nations should hold sovereignty over territory and
resources in outer space, and that prospectors should be made
to acquire concessions, leases, or licenses from the United
settlement (reporting on a non-profit organization attempting to raise funding for
colonization of Mars); Human Settlement on Mars in 2023, MARS ONE, http://marsone.com/en/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
33 . See Mission, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
mission/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) [hereinafter PLANETARY, Mission] (describing
Planetary Resources’ intention to make asteroid materials available for human use);
Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (asserting that Planetary Resources intends to mine
asteroids to support human activity on Earth and in space).
34. See Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (describing Planetary Resources’s plan to use or
sell asteroid resources on Earth and in space); PLANETARY, Mission, supra note 33
(describing how Planetary Resources intends to supply human activity on Earth and in
space).
35. See Technology, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
technology/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (asserting that the satellites, called “Arkyds,” will
identify target asteroids for prospecting); Marks, supra note 28 (explaining that satellite
telescopes orbiting the Earth will seek out valuable asteroids).
36. See Our Team, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
team/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) [hereinafter PLANETARY, Our Team] (explaining that
Chris Lewicki was flight director for Mars rovers Spirit and Opportunity); Kirk Johnson,
A Start-Up Sees a Gold Rush Among the Stars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2012, at A12 (reporting
that Mr. Lewicki spent ten years at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory before joining
Planetary Resources).
37. See Marks, supra note 28 (reporting that Planetary Resources employs more
than thirty former NASA engineers and is backed by former Google executives); see also
PLANETARY, Our Team, supra note 36 (describing various NASA veterans at Planetary
Resources, and investors Larry Page and Eric E. Schmidt, Google’s CEO and former
CEO, respectively).
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Nations to exploit those resources.38 Part I of this Note examines
the history of sovereignty and property rights over newly
discovered resources on Earth. Part II considers recent attempts
to establish international law for space exploration. In Part III,
this Note applies historical precedent and existing law to argue
that celestial resources should belong to the prospectors who
claim them through physical possession and use, because no
government on this planet has sovereignty in outer space.
I. ABORIGINAL TITLE, EXTRATERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY,
AND THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
In Part I.A, this Note considers the property rights of
aboriginal settlers, focusing on the example of the first Pacific
Islanders. Those pioneers, like today’s space explorers, left their
homes in the most sophisticated vehicles their society could
produce, and crossed the frontier to discover a series of rocky
outposts that no people had previously claimed. Part I.B
examines the claims of distant European nations over territory
in the “New World,” including the Pacific Islands. European
governments imposed extraterritorial sovereignty upon these
lands in much the same way that organs of the United Nations
have attempted to assert that body’s sovereignty over territory
and resources in outer space. Finally, Part I.C discusses
unclaimed minerals in the Earth’s deep seabed. Some scholars
and jurists have argued that these resources are “the common
heritage of mankind,” which is the same language the United
Nations has used to describe space resources.
A. Aboriginal Title: The Reward of Discovery
About 3,000 years ago, some men and women in canoes
made their way across the Pacific Ocean, using the stars
overhead as navigational aids, until they reached the islets of the
Kwajalein Atoll, where they made their homes.39 If they had a
38. See, e.g., WILFRED C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 398 (1962).
39. See FRANCIS X. HEZEL, THE FIRST TAINT OF CIVILIZATION 3 (2000) (describing
the settlement of the Marshall Islands); Ward H. Goodenough, Native Astronomy in
Micronesia: A Rudimentary Science, 73 SCI. MONTHLY 105, 105–07 (1951) (describing
indigenous celestial navigation in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands); CIA, Republic of
the Marshall Islands, WORLD FACTBOOK (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rm.html (explaining that the Kwajalein Atoll is
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cartographer among them, or a well-traveled fisherman, he or
she would have learned that the only other lands within
practical travelling distance were tiny strips of sand and
vegetation very much like those of Kwajalein, isolated in the
middle of Earth’s largest body of water.40
When these aboriginal peoples took possession of
Kwajalein’s islands, they established themselves as the rightful
owners of those territories for as long as they chose to occupy
them, under a principle that came to be known as aboriginal
title.41 Courts in several countries have consistently ruled that
indigenous inhabitants of territory hold aboriginal title to their
land by right of first claim and continuous use.42 Aboriginal title
acknowledges a first inhabitant’s right to territory irrespective of
whether another government blessed the acquisition of that
territory in the first place. 43 All that is required to prove
aboriginal title is a demonstration of actual, exclusive, and
continuous possession of the territory in question since time

one of twenty-nine island chains in what is now the Republic of the Marshall Islands, a
northern Pacific multiple-island nation about half-way between Hawai’i and Australia).
40. See Pacific Ocean Map, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://events.nationalgeographic
.com/media/files/PACIFIC.OCEAN_GTM.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (depicting
the location of Kwajalein).
41. See John Briscoe, The Aboriginal Land Title of the Native People of Guam, 26 U.
HAW. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (describing indigenous peoples’ right to first-occupied
territory as “aboriginal title”); Julie Cassidy, The Enforcement of Aboriginal Rights in
Customary International Law, 4 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59 (1993) (citing uniform
state practice in Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and Canada as evidence that
aboriginal title is a principle of customary international law); Kent McNeil, Aboriginal
Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty, 5 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.
253, 254 (1998) (describing Canadian recognition of aboriginal title to land as early as
1888).
42. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941); see also
Snake or Piute Indians v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 543, 552 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (holding
that claimants can prove aboriginal title by establishing actual, exclusive, and
continuous possession since time immemorial); Cassidy, supra note 41, at 59 (citing
uniform state practice in Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and Canada as
evidence that aboriginal title is a principle of customary international law).
43. See Briscoe, supra note 41, at 4 (describing how aboriginal title depends on
first use and continuous possession, not a foreign government’s assertion of
sovereignty); Cassidy, supra note 41, at 59 (describing aboriginal title as a customary
principle of international law that allows for the establishment of property rights
without the grant of title by an outside sovereign).
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immemorial.44 Aboriginal title is therefore a legal recognition of
the property rights of claimants who were not preceded by a
prior owner.45
B. Terra Nullius and the Exercise of Remote Sovereignty
More than 2,000 years after the original settlers arrived on
Kwajalein, the inhabitants of nearby Guam were the first Pacific
Islanders to encounter Europeans. 46 On March 6, 1521, a
Portuguese mercenary named Ferdinand Magellan anchored his
ship near Guam and brought a small party ashore in a landing
craft.47 The residents of Kwajalein probably encountered their
first Europeans fourteen years later, when on January 7, 1535, a
crew of Spanish mutineers landed on the Atoll’s southernmost
island.48 The Kwajalein Atoll, like other outposts throughout the
Pacific, soon fell under Spanish dominion.49
The European agents who first claimed these colonies and
possessions did so in accordance with the principle of terra
nullius.50 Terra nullius is closely related to aboriginal title because
it allows the discoverer of unclaimed lands to acquire and use
them.51 Aboriginal settlers are by definition the occupants of
44. See Sante Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 347; see also Snake or Piute Indians, 112 F.
Supp. at 552 (holding that claimants can prove aboriginal title by establishing actual,
exclusive, and continuous possession since time immemorial).
45. See Sante Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 347; Snake or Piute Indians, 112 F. Supp. at
552.
46. See HEZEL, supra note 39, at 1–2 (describing the first encounter between
Magellan and the Guamian Pacific Islanders as the first contact between Europeans
and Pacific Islanders); see also ROBERT F. ROGERS, DESTINY’S LANDFALL: A HISTORY OF
GUAM 1 (1995) (describing how Guam became the first inhabited island in the Pacific
known to Europeans when Magellan landed there in 1521).
47. HEZEL, supra note 39, at 1–2.
48. Id. at 23 (describing the arrival of the mutineers).
49. Marshall Islands History, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/366624/Marshall-Islands/53997/History (last visited Oct. 23, 2013);
History of the Marshall Islands, MARSH. IS., http://www.rmiembassyus.org/History.htm
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (describing how Spain ruled what came to be known as the
Marshall Islands until 1899).
50. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 11 (7th ed. 2010) (describing terra
nullius as European explorers applied it); see also M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND
GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1926) (describing
territorium nullius as no sovereign’s land).
51. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 50, at 11 (describing a discoverer’s rights
under terra nullius); see also LINDLEY, supra note 50, at 2 (describing sovereign
acquisition of territorium nullius).

246 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:235
lands with no previous resident, so one might call their lands
“terra nullius.”52 As a legal term of art, however, terra nullius does
not typically describe aboriginal occupation of truly uninhabited
lands. 53 Instead, the term often refers to the mistaken or
dishonest conceit by which Europeans justified their conquests
of indigenous peoples’ territories.54
Even though the rights of conquest and terra nullius
granted spoils to victors, European monarchs did not depend
exclusively on the speed and martial skill of their explorers to
acquire territory.55 The Papacy, which exercised some power as
an international authority in the late Fifteenth Century,
occasionally granted to certain countries the exclusive right to
explore and conquer designated areas of the world. 56 Popes
made these grants through Papal Bulls, which first asserted the
Papacy’s dominion over the entire Earth, and then ceded to
certain monarchs the right to claim territory in specified areas.57
One of these Bulls was the Bull Inter Caetera of 1493, which
divided the undiscovered world along a longitude boundary west
of the Azores.58 The Bull Inter Caetera, reinforced by the Treaty
52. Aboriginal Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/aboriginal (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (defining “aboriginal” as “being the
first or earliest known of its kind present in a region”).
53 . See SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 42 (1996) (describing postcolonial accusations that European conquerors adopted the theory of terra nullius when
they dispossessed native inhabitants).
54 . See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (7th ed. 1997); Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology
and Property Law in Early Australia, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 95, 97 (2005) (describing the
extent to which British explorers and colonists relied on terra nullius to expel
indigenous inhabitants).
55. See HEZEL, supra note 39, at 8; KORMAN, supra note 53, at 8–9 (describing the
Papal Bulls through which the Papacy assigned to various European sovereigns the
exclusive right to explore and conquer territory).
56. HEZEL, supra note 39, at 8.
57. See, e.g., Bull “Inter Caetera Divinae” of Pope Alexander VI Dividing the New
Continents and Granting America to Spain (May 4, 1493), in CHURCH AND STATE
THROUGH THE CENTURIES 153, 156–57 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall eds. &
trans., 1967) (“[We, the Papacy] give, concede and assign to you . . . solely out of our
largess . . . by the authority of Almighty God . . . all the islands and mainlands, found or
to be found, discovered or to be discovered [within a designated area] . . . . And we
concede them by the strength of the present document perpetually with all their
dominions, towns, castles, localities and villages and all rights, jurisdictions and
appurtenances to you and your heirs and successors . . . .”).
58. See id.
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of Tordesillas the next year, allowed Portugal to claim the ports
and sea lanes around Africa’s coasts.59 The Spanish, being thus
denied eastern access to the spice trade, embarked on a series of
westward expeditions across the Atlantic in search of a roundthe-world route to the East Indies.60 This campaign eventually
brought the Spanish to the Pacific, Magellan to Guam, and the
mutineers to Kwajalein.61
European notions of conquest and sovereignty had
disastrous implications for indigenous peoples. 62 Weak
populations were not the equals of strong European nations in
the eyes of international law.63 Due to terra nullius and the naked
ambition for conquest, international law in the Age of
Exploration did little to prevent Europeans from running
roughshod over the rights of natives.64 While the tragedies that
ensued during centuries of European colonialism are well
documented and beyond the scope of this Note, one tragedy is
worth special mention. 65 The European monarchs who
conquered territories like Kwajalein claimed for themselves an
authority known as sovereignty, which included the exclusive

59. See Treaty between Spain and Portugal Concluded at Tordesillas, Spain-Port.,
June 2, 1494 (reinforcing the division of territory for exploration between East and
West, in accordance with the Bull Inter Caetera); Bull Inter Caetera, supra note 57;
HEZEL, supra note 39, at 6–8 (describing treaty-based motivation for Spanish to explore
westward).
60. See HEZEL, supra note 39, at 6–8 (describing Spain’s westward expeditions in
search of spices after Portugal monopolized the eastern route).
61. See Id. at 2, 23 (describing Magellan’s travel to Guam and the mutineers travel
to Kwajalein).
62. See KORMAN, supra note 53, at 12 (describing how the right of conquest
allowed European conquerors to fight unjust wars while asserting moral impunity);
MALANCZUK, supra note 54, at 148 (describing how the right of conquest disadvantaged
weaker societies).
63. See KORMAN, supra note 53, at 12.
64. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823) (Justice Marshall observing
that “the character and religion of [North America’s indigenous] inhabitants afforded
an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe
might claim an ascendancy”). But see JOHN E. OSTER, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL 125 (1914) (“[E]very oppression now exercised on a
helpless people depending on our magnanimity and justice for the preservation of
their existence impresses a deep stain on the American character.”).
65 . See generally MERCEDES MAROTO CAMINO, EXPLORING THE EXPLORERS:
SPANIARDS IN OCEANIA, 1519–1794 (2012); see also FRANCIS X. HEZEL, STRANGERS IN
THEIR OWN LAND (2003) (describing the harms that foreign conquerors inflicted upon
Pacific Islanders).
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rights to grant and transfer land.66 By claiming sovereignty over
lands beyond their state borders, the Europeans exercised a type
of power that the US Code describes as “extraterritorial
sovereignty.”67 Extraterritorial sovereignty is a greater imposition
of government power overseas than so-called extraterritorial
jurisdiction, which nations may occasionally assert over persons
outside of their borders.68 Whereas extraterritorial jurisdiction
would have given European governments the power to regulate
the conduct of their explorers overseas, extraterritorial
sovereignty gave these foreign governments the power to claim
the soil on which their explorers stood, and stop indigenous
people from using that territory except at the will of a European
government or its colonial successor.69 Only in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries did international law finally recognize
that indigenous peoples’ original occupancy of land established
their legal title to that land. 70 When Kwajalein achieved
independence along with its neighbors in the Twentieth
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (describing how
European sovereigns claimed for themselves the right to grant the soil, a right which
the US Congress inherited from the British monarchy); Briscoe, supra note 41, at 1, 4.
67 . 30 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2012) (distinguishing between “extraterritorial
sovereignty” and extraterritorial jurisdiction). The distinction arose in a provision of
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (“DSHMRA”), §§ 1401–1473, a law in
which the United States recognized the rights of its citizens to mine for resources in
seabed beneath international waters, also known as the deep seabed. See generally id. In
this particular provision of the DSHMRA, called the “disclaimer of extraterritorial
sovereignty,” the United States maintained its jurisdiction over United States persons
and vessels exploring the deep seabed, but specifically disclaimed any assertion of
sovereignty over the deep seabed itself, or its resources. See § 1402(a). This Note will
return to the deep seabed in Part I.C.
68. See id. (distinguishing between extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons and
actions, and extraterritorial sovereignty over areas and resources); Brian L. Porto,
Annotation, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 415 § 2 (2005)
(describing extraterritorial jurisdiction as the extension of United States law over
persons overseas); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (describing how Europeans dispossessed
natives by asserting sovereignty over the New World).
69. Cf. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574; Briscoe, supra note 41, at 1, 4; U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 (describing how European governments claimed for themselves the right to
grant the soil, a right which the United States Congress inherited from the British
monarchy and expressed affirmatively in its assertion of the exclusive right to regulate
land and the commerce upon it); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1402 (describing a claim to areas
or resources outside of a nation’s territory as extraterritorial sovereignty, and
distinguishing that right from extraterritorial jurisdiction over person and vessels).
70. See supra notes 41–45 (explaining how Aboriginal title exists independent of
government action, and can be proved by actual, exclusive, and continuous possession
since time immemorial).
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Century, the Islanders decided to use their territory in a manner
that is now of particular interest to space explorers, as we will see
in Part III.B.
C. Earth’s Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind?
The age of land discovery on Earth has effectively ended.71
Aside from a few newly forming volcanic islands, all of Earth’s
dry land has been discovered and claimed by one or more
sovereigns, or specifically reserved against claim by any
sovereign.72 Nations also claim the waters immediately adjacent
to their coastlines, as well as the seabed beneath their coastal
waters.73 Territorial claims in coastal waters form a complex and
controversial subject beyond the scope of this Note. For the
purpose of analogy to outer space, it is only necessary to
understand that nations exercise some sovereignty over the
waters and seabeds adjacent to their coastlines, but there are
other portions of seabed, far from any coast, that are not subject
to any nation’s sovereignty. 74 Scholars refer to these remote
portions as collectively “the Area” or “the deep seabed.”75
As Magellan traversed the Pacific in search of cloves from
the Molucca Islands, he could have had no practical concern for
the deep seabed more than eleven kilometers beneath him.76 He
could not know that it contained nodes of gold, silver, nickel,
copper, and zinc, as well as other resources.77 In Magellan’s
71. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 50, at 11 (asserting that land discovery has
effectively ended).
72. Id.
73. See generally George K. Walker, Filling Some of the Gaps: The International Law
Association (American Branch) Law of the Sea Definitions Project, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1336 (2009) (describing various controversies between nations asserting conflicting
claims to undersea resources).
74. See Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2749, pmbl. (Dec. 17, 1970) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2749]
(describing “the Area” outside of national jurisdiction).
75 . See id.; see also 3 E.D. BROWN, SEABED ENERGY AND MINERALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 3 (2001) (defining “the Area” or “the deep seabed”).
76 . The average ocean depth is 4.3 kilometers. See Ocean Facts, NAT’L
OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/
oceandepth.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (describing the Pacific Ocean as eleven
kilometers deep in some areas).
77. See NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEEP SEABED MINING, A
REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (Dec. 1995), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/

250 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:235
time, and for centuries afterward, no legal regime existed to
govern the exploration of the deep seabed. 78 When people
developed technology to reach the deep seabed in the
Twentieth Century, the territory became the subject of
competing interpretations of property rights in international
law.79
In 1970, the UN General Assembly attempted to assert
international authority over the deep seabed and its resources.80
The General Assembly passed a resolution entitled the
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction (“Declaration of Principles”).81 The Declaration of
Principles called for the establishment of an international legal
regime to govern the deep seabed “as soon as possible.”82
In the same document, the General Assembly declared the
deep seabed and its resources to be “the common heritage of
mankind,” and forbade states and persons, natural or corporate,
from appropriating the seabed by any means.83 The Declaration
of Principles also called for states, persons, and corporations to
refrain from exercising or acquiring rights over resources in the
deep seabed, except when granted permission by the
international legal regime that the General Assembly hoped to
create.84
According to the Declaration of Principles, the proposed
regime for the deep seabed would govern all exploration of its
resources.85 The regime would require that miners only explore
gcil_dsm_87_20110607084359.pdf; see also Seabed Mining: The Unplumbed Riches of the
Deep, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, at 30 (describing resources in the deep seabed).
78. G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 75, pmbl. (“[R]ecognizing that the existing legal
regime of the high seas does not provide substantive rules for regulating the
exploration of the aforesaid area and the exploitation of its resources.”).
79. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 75, ¶¶ 1–4 (describing deep seabed
resources as “the common heritage of mankind,” to be collected and distributed under
international supervision). Contra Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1401–1412 (2012) (allowing certain US persons to collect deep seabed
resources for themselves).
80. See G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 75, ¶¶ 1–4 (asserting international authority
over the deep seabed and its resources).
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id. ¶¶ 1–3 (prohibiting national claims over the seabed).
84. Id. ¶ 3 (prohibiting the acquisition of rights to the seabed).
85. Id. ¶ 4 (describing the hoped-for regime).
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and exploit the seabed for mankind’s benefit as a whole.86 The
regime would also manage deep seabed mining to provide
expanding opportunities for its use and ensure equitable
sharing of its benefits among states, giving “particular
consideration” to developing and land-locked nations. 87
Industrialized nations refused to accept the Declaration of
Principles as legally binding and declined to recognize its
assertions as even an interim regime over the deep seabed,
specifically rejecting the “common heritage of mankind”
language.88
In 1982, the United Nations attempted to establish a deep
seabed legal regime when it proposed the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), which came
into force (at least for the nations that ratified it) in 1994.89 After
decades of negotiation and modification, UNCLOS still echoes
the language of the 1970 Declaration of Principles: the deep
seabed and its resources are “the common heritage of
mankind.” 90 UNCLOS created the International Seabed
Authority (“ISA”), a UN regulator to govern exploration in the
deep seabed. 91 UNCLOS required the ISA to distribute the
proceeds of seabed mining to developing nations, and even
directed the ISA to transfer seabed miners’ technology to those
nations. 92 UNCLOS also limited mining activity in the deep
seabed to UNCLOS’s States Parties, or persons and companies

86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 9 (explaining the purpose of the regime).
88. See BROWN, supra note 76, at 3 (describing industrial nations’ objections to the
G.A. Res. 2749).
89. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also BROWN, supra note 76, at 4 (explaining
that the General Assembly proposed UNCLOS in 1982). No western developed nation
joined for twelve years, which led to a compromise “Protocol of 1994.” The
compromise somewhat loosened the requirements for sharing deep seabed resources.
Most developed nations, except the United States, accepted the compromise and
joined UNCLOS. See Richard J. McLaughlin, Settling Trade-Related Disputes over the
Protection of Marine Living Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO?, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
29, 36 (1997).
90. UNCLOS, supra note 90, art. 136 (declaring the Area and its resources to be
the common heritage of mankind).
91. Id. art. 156 (establishing the International Seabed Authority).
92. Id. arts. 140, 144, 160 (mandating the transfer of resources and technology
from seabed miners to other nations).
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they controlled.93 The only other organization allowed to mine
the deep seabed under UNCLOS would be a new entity called
“the Enterprise,” a UN-operated mining company, which would
take funds and technology from other seabed miners, mine
portions of the seabed where the other miners discovered
resources, and distribute its profits throughout the world. 94
While the ISA currently operates from its headquarters in
Jamaica, the Enterprise does not yet exist.95
The United States has consistently rejected, through
statements at the United Nations and in domestic law, the
authority of any organization, including the ISA, to govern
access to minerals beneath international waters.96 The United
States, like other industrialized nations, asserted after the first
UNCLOS proposal that the freedom of the high seas allows all
states to engage in deep seabed mining without international
regulation. 97 While many industrialized nations eventually
compromised on the issue of seabed mining in order to accede
to UNCLOS and gain its other benefits, the United States has
still not ratified the Convention.98 UNCLOS opponents point to
its common heritage principle and the ISA’s claim of effective

93. Id. art. 153 (prohibiting mining by non-States Parties).
94. Id. arts. 153, 170 (requiring seabed miners to identify multiple potentially
valuable mining sites so that the Enterprise can choose to mine one of the sites itself
using technology and startup funding provided by the miners).
95 . See About Us, INT’L SEABED AUTH. (Apr. 2009), http://www.isa.org.jm/
en/about (describing the ISA organization, illustrating that the Enterprise does not yet
exist).
96. See Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 (1983), in 17 THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 243, UN Sales No. E.84.V.3
(1984) [hereinafter US Statement] (statement by the United States of America); see also
30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (2012) (asserting that “exploration for and commercial
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas
subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of
those and other freedoms recognized by general principles of international law”).
97. See US Statement, supra note 96; see also BROWN, supra note 76, at 18 (describing
the American position with regard to deep seabed mining).
98. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UNITED NATIONS, 8
(Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf
(illustrating that the United States has not ratified UNCLOS); see also BROWN, supra
note 76, at 4.
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sovereignty over the deep seabed as some of the issues
preventing ratification.99
UNCLOS proponents have argued that international
sovereignty over the deep seabed is necessary to establish a firm
foundation of property rights so as to encourage exploration.100
However, the experience of deep seabed explorers during
UNCLOS’s development does not support this assertion.101 The
United States’ refusal to accede to UNCLOS has not prevented
American companies from claiming and exploring regions of
the deep seabed in preparation for mining.102 As early as 1986,
the US Mission to the United Nations formally notified the
United Nations that the US government had given American
companies permission to explore and exploit the deep seabed in
the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, which lies five kilometers below
the surface of the Pacific Ocean, about halfway between Hawai‘i
and Mexico.103 Although technical difficulties still render seabed
mining unprofitable, several business ventures have successfully
extracted tons of manganese nodules, nickel, copper, and cobalt
from the deep seabed in the eastern Pacific.104

99. See Steven Groves, Opening Remarks, Panel V–Debate: Resolved: The Senate Should
Give Prompt Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention, in THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION, US ACCESSION AND GLOBALIZATION 105 (Nordquist et al. eds., 2012)
(criticizing UNCLOS and its common heritage principle).
100. Ambassador John Norton Moore, Opening Remarks, Panel V–Debate: Resolved:
The Senate Should Give Prompt Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention, in THE
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, supra note 99, at 100 (arguing that the International
Seabed Authority is necessary to establish the stable property rights necessary to enable
American industries to invest in resource exploitation in the deep seabed).
101. Steven Groves, The US Can Mine the Deep Seabed Without Joining the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 4, 2012, at 1, 5
(asserting that United States non-accession to UNCLOS is not holding back deep
seabed mining); INT’L SEABED AUTH., Draft Environmental Management Plan for the
Clarion-Clipperton Zone, ISBA/17/LTC.WP.1 5 (Jan. 28, 2011), available at http://
www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/17Sess/LTC/ISBA-17LTC-WP1.pdf (describing
current American efforts to mine the deep seabed).
102. See Groves, supra note 101, at 5; ISA, supra note 101.
103. See Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law
of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 7 iii (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter Law of the Sea
Bulletin] (describing how the Bulletin is a UN publication detailing the ratification
status of the UNCLOS, as well as national laws, regulations and other actions affecting
the law of the sea); see also Groves, supra note 102, at 17.
104. See THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (2009) (describing seabed mining, its
successful extractions, and its economic failures).
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The United Nations published the claims of US companies
to the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in its Law of the Sea Bulletin, a
registry of claims at sea.105 While the United Nations explicitly
denies that it recognizes these claims, it stands to reason that
publicizing claims reduces confusion and the potential for
conflict.106 Controversies persist, but thanks to the Law of the Sea
Bulletin and other dispute resolution mechanisms, conflicts
between explorers are not as a problematic now as they were in
the days of Magellan.107
Proponents of the common heritage principle also argue
that it will help preserve the deep seabed’s natural
environment.108 They point out that the absence of international
governance may have serious consequences for the current
inhabitants of the ocean floor. 109 Areas like the ClarionClipperton Zone probably contain more than one thousand
species of plant and animal life, many of which are still unknown
to the scientific community. 110 Mining the ocean floor may
disturb or destroy some of these species, and significantly harm
their ecosystem.111
II. LAW ON THE FINAL FRONTIER
This Part examines the United Nations’ right to establish
sovereignty over territory and resources in outer space, which we
will call extraterrestrial (as opposed to extraterritorial)
sovereignty. Part II.A discusses legal and policy reasons
105. See Law of the Sea Bulletin, supra note 103 (listing claims to deep seabed
resources).
106. See id. (disclaiming recognition of publicized claims).
107. See, e.g., NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 342 (2004) (describing dispute resolution under
UNCLOS).
108. See UNCLOS, supra note 89, art. 145; see also BROWN, supra note 76, at 53
(stating that the common heritage of mankind’s ratione materiae, or subject matter
jurisdiction, extends to environmental protection).
109. See Jan Magne Markussen, Deep Seabed Mining and the Environment, in GREEN
GLOBE YEARBOOK 33 (Helge Ole Bergesen & Georg Parmann eds., 1994) (describing
the dangers of deep seabed mining for flora and fauna on the ocean floor).
110. See Brigitte Ebbe et al., Diversity of Abyssal Marine Life, in LIFE IN THE WORLD’S
OCEANS 154 (Alasdair D. McIntyre ed., 2010) (describing flora and fauna on the ocean
floor).
111. See Markussen, supra note 109, at 33 (describing environmental harms arising
from deep seabed mining).
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supporting UN extraterrestrial sovereignty. Part II.B follows with
the arguments against UN extraterrestrial sovereignty.
A. Extraterrestrial Sovereignty
For the first 4.5 billion years of its existence, the Moon was
like all other celestial bodies in the universe: human activity had
never disturbed it.112 The Moon orbited around the blue planet,
controlling Earth’s tides and bearing the occasional impacts of
asteroids, meteors, and comets.113 Then, on September 12, 1959,
a rocket launched from the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan,
propelling a 359-kilogram metal sphere out of Earth’s
atmosphere and onto a collision course with the Moon.114 This
little unmanned spacecraft slammed into the Moon and
scattered small metal objects bearing the Soviet Union’s
hammer and sickle emblem across the lunar surface.115 Upon
learning of the Soviets’ success, the US State Department
immediately announced that the Soviet probe had not legally
claimed the Moon.116 Although the Soviets explicitly denied that
their landing constituted a territorial claim, the Luna 2 mission
inspired efforts at the United Nations to establish an
international regime for control of outer space.117
1. The Outer Space Treaty
The first UN effort to govern space activity culminated with
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
112. Earth’s Moon: Read More, NASA, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/profile.
cfm?Object=Moon&Display=OverviewLong (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing the
natural history of the Moon prior to the first human probe landing).
113. See id.
114. Luna 2, NASA, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/masterCatalog.do?sc=1959014A (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (describing the Soviet space program’s Luna 2
mission).
115. See id.; see also Max Frankel, Soviet Rocket Hits Moon After 35 Hours; Arrival Is
Calculated Within 84 Seconds; Signals Received Till Moment of Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1959, at 1 (reporting Luna 2’s successful landing).
116. See Peter Kihss, US Rejects Any Flag-Planting as Legal Claim to Rule Moon, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1959, at 1 (reporting United States’ rejection of any hypothetical
territorial claim).
117. See Peter Kihss, Pleas Are Expected to Mount for UN Control of Outer Space, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1959, at 20 (reporting on United States’ advocacy for an international
convention regarding space activity).
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Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”), which the
United States signed and ratified in 1967.118 The Outer Space
Treaty is widely accepted. 119 Some scholars contend that the
Treaty is customary international law in its entirety, whereas
others believe that only its first four articles are universally
binding.120
The Outer Space Treaty, along with four other treaties,
established the basic principles of international law in outer
space.121 Article I of the Outer Space Treaty describes outer
space in general as “the province of all mankind,” and requires
that space exploration benefit all countries, irrespective of their
degree of scientific development.122 It goes on to demand that
space be open for use and exploration by all countries,
including access for scientific investigation. 123 Article II
specifically prohibits “national appropriation” of celestial bodies
by claim of sovereignty, means of use or occupation, or “any
other means.”124 The Treaty applies to non-state actors as well:
article VI holds States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty
responsible for ensuring that the “national activities” of their
non-governmental organizations comply with its provisions.125
118. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; see also Kelly M.
Zullo, The Need to Clarify the Status of Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO.
L.J. 2413, 2415 n.12 (2002) (describing the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty).
119 . See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178 (describing the widespread
acceptance of the Outer Space Treaty).
120. See Eileen Galloway, The History and Development of Space Law: International
Law and the United States Law, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 295, 300 (1982); see also Heidi
Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
345, 352–53 (1995); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 180 (describing various opinions
regarding the binding nature of treaty provisions).
121. See Keefe, supra note 120, at 345 (describing the other four treaties as “the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space of April 1968 (the Astronaut Agreement), the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of March
1972 (the Liability Convention), the Convention on the Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space of January 1975 (the Registration Convention), and the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
of December 1979 (the Moon Agreement).”).
122. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. I (providing for free access to
space).
123. Id.
124. Id. art. II (prohibiting national appropriation of space).
125. Id. art. VI (holding nations responsible for the actions of their citizens).
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The Treaty also asserts two environmental interests.126 It
requires States Parties to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s
environment through space activities. 127 It also admonishes
States Parties to avoid harmful contamination of celestial bodies
during exploration.128
The Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition against sovereignty
and appropriation in space has led some scholars to conclude
that celestial bodies are res extra commercium, and cannot be
owned. 129 Some read the “national activities” provision as a
prohibition against individual space property.130
2. The Moon Agreement
The United Nations established the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) at the urging of the
United States in 1959. 131 COPUOS publishes documents
applying international law to space.132 It also negotiates space
treaties on behalf of the United Nations.133 In 1979, following
initiatives by the United States and Argentina, COPUOS
proposed to the General Assembly a document that became the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (“Moon Agreement”). 134 The Moon

126. Id. art. IX (establishing environmental preservation rules).
127. Id. (requiring States Parties to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s environment
through the introduction of extraterrestrial material).
128. Id. (requiring States Parties to avoid harmful contamination of celestial
bodies).
129 . See, e.g., LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 184 (describing scholarly
arguments that celestial bodies cannot be owned).
130. See, e.g., Carl Q. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited, in 9
ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 217–44 (Nicolas Mateesco Matte ed., 1984) (asserting
that no one can claim property in space).
131. See International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res.
1472, ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 13 (Dec. 9, 1959) [hereinafter G.A. Res.
1472] (establishing COPUOS); United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
NATIONS
OFFICE
FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFFAIRS
Space,
UNITED
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html (last visited Dec. 11,
2012) [hereinafter UNOOSA] (describing COPUOS and its location); see also Zullo,
supra note 119, at 2417 (describing COPUOS and its establishment).
132. G.A. Res 1472 (XIV), supra note 131, at 5.
133. Id.
134. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]; see also
GANGALE, supra note 78, at 70 (describing how, ironically, the capitalist United States
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Agreement, which entered into force for its States Parties in
1984, declares celestial bodies and their resources to be the
common heritage of mankind. 135 It contemplates the future
creation of an international regime, to govern all celestial bodies
in Earth’s solar system as soon as the exploitation of space
resources is about to become feasible.136 The regime would then
ensure the equitable distribution on Earth of resources from
space.137
The Moon Agreement’s planned-for regime would
effectively assert UN sovereignty over space territory by
prohibiting States from recovering celestial materials, except
samples for scientific research, and forbidding States from using
areas of celestial bodies except as research stations, launch pads,
and logistical staging areas.138 The Agreement pointedly rejects
individual acquisition of property in or on celestial bodies.139
The Moon Agreement also includes strict environmental
provisions. 140 Under the Agreement’s proposed regime,
explorers would only use celestial bodies to the extent necessary
for scientific research. 141 The regime would also prohibit
pollution of celestial environments and require States Parties to
inform the Secretary General of all measures taken to ensure
compliance.142

inserted common heritage language into the Moon Agreement against the wishes of
the socialist Soviet Union).
135. See Moon Agreement, supra note 134, arts. 1 para. 1, 11 para. 1 (asserting
that celestial bodies are the common heritage of mankind).
136. See id. art. 11 para. 5 (requiring States Parties to establish the described
space-governance regime as soon as resource exploitation is about to become feasible).
137 . See id. art. 11 para. 7(d) (requiring the equitable sharing of celestial
resources among all States Parties, “whereby the interests and needs of developing
countries . . . shall be given special consideration”); see also Carol R. Buxton, Property in
Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right”
Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689, 699 (2004) (noting that the Moon
Agreement envisions a regime “reminiscent of the regime established to regulate
exploitation of the seabed”).
138. See Moon Agreement, supra note 134, art. 6 para. 2 (regulating removal of
resources); id. art. 8 (regulating logistics sites).
139. See id. art. 11 (prohibiting acquisition of property).
140. See id. art. 7 (providing for the protection of the environment in space).
141. See id. art. 9 (regulating scientific research in space).
142. See id.
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3. Property without Sovereignty?
Another argument supporting UN sovereignty over celestial
bodies is the theory that no one may own property except with
the permission of a government.143 The argument goes that only
a government with sovereignty over territory may grant property
rights to an individual.144 A similar argument holds that while
property rights are theoretically possible without a government’s
grant of title, such rights are practically useless without the
protection of a sovereign power.145 Since the Outer Space Treaty
precludes national sovereignty in space, proponents of this
theory assert that no one can acquire private property on
celestial bodies.146
Some scholars have argued that a new international legal
regime is necessary to grant property rights in space. 147
Proposals include a resource distribution mechanism modeled
on the ISA, an internationally regulated market, and an
essentially hands-off approach in which private companies claim
asteroids (but not larger bodies like planets and moons) as
chattels rather than real property.148
4. American Asteroid Law
The US government is apparently undecided on the issue
of private property in space.149 However, a State Department
143. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 184 (describing scholarly arguments that
celestial bodies cannot be owned).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., GANGALE, supra note 78, at 10 (“Outside [a controlling legal
regime], where a state of anarchy prevails, any claim to property must be defended by
the force of arms; it is not a right, but a physical fact of occupation.”).
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Zullo, supra note 118, at 2338 (arguing that a new authority is
required to govern for-profit exploration).
148. See Keefe, supra note 120, at 369 (describing the International Seabed
Authority as a potential model for UN regulation in space); see also Lynn M. Fountain,
Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the “Common Heritage of
Mankind” Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1774 (2003) (proposing a regulated market
in space resources); Andrew Tingkang, These Aren’t the Asteroids You Are Looking For:
Classifying Asteroids in Space as Chattels, Not Land, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559, 580 (2012)
(proposing an unregulated market for asteroid acquisition).
149. Compare Letter from Ralph A. Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced
Technology, United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs to Gregory William Nemitz (Aug. 3, 2003)
[hereinafter Braibanti letter], available at http://www.erosproject.com/exhibit01.html
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letter arising from a unique legal controversy gives some
credence to supporters of UN sovereignty in space.150 The issue
arose in 2001, when aerospace consultant Gregory Nemitz
published on a website his own claim to asteroid 433 Eros, just
before NASA’s probe reached that object. 151 In a letter to
Nemitz, NASA’s general counsel pointed out that, unlike deep
seabed miners who enjoy American statutory law explicitly
authorizing and recognizing their claims, space property
claimants have no such protection.152 In a subsequent letter on
the same subject, a State Department official categorically
denied that that a person may own an asteroid.153
Three years later, the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada rejected Nemitz’s claim that NASA should pay
him US$0.20 per year to park its probe on “his” asteroid.154 The
court found that the website on which he registered his claim
conferred no property rights.155 Nemitz failed to demonstrate
that either the Ninth Amendment or the Tenth Amendment to
the US Constitution provided a legal cause of action against
NASA. 156 The court also rejected Nemitz’s assertion that a
Congressional statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 42, which required
NASA to encourage commercial use of space, established

(last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (asserting that the Outer Space Treaty prohibits private
property in space), with STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TECH., 96TH
CONGRESS, AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND
OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 465–66 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SENATE
COMMITTEE REPORT] (advising Congress not to ratify the Moon Agreement in order to
uphold property rights in space).
150. See Braibanti letter, supra note 149 (asserting that the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits private property in space).
151 . See Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL
3167042 at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. Nat’l Aeronautics &
Space Admin., 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005) (“There is absolutely no legal basis for
asserting that such a[n online] registry creates a property interest in the asteroid.”).
152. Letter from Edward A. Frankle, General Counsel, NASA, to Gregory Nemitz,
Chief Executive Officer, Orbital Development (Apr. 9 2001), available at
http://www.erosproject.com/exhibit02.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (citing Deep
Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473).
153. See Braibanti letter, supra note 149.
154. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1 (finding that the Archimedes Institute, on
whose website Nemitz registered his claim, specifically disclaimed any authority to
confer property rights).
155. See id.
156. See id.
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Nemitz’s property right on an asteroid.157 Finally, the court held
that neither the United States’ rejection of the Moon
Agreement, nor its ratification of the Outer Space Treaty,
created any rights for Nemitz to appropriate property in an
asteroid.158
B. Free Space
In the dark, cold vacuum of space, a certain gray rock orbits
the Sun in an elliptical pattern never closer than 134 million
kilometers from the yellow star.159 On Earth, the rock is known
as asteroid 1999 RQ36, and the best estimate of modern science
is that its natural orbit will never bring it closer than 445,738
kilometers from the Vienna International Center, where
COPUOS holds its sessions.160 As of this writing, 1999 RQ36 is
several million kilometers away from Vienna, and yet the Moon
Agreement asserts that the United Nations and COPUOS should
exercise sovereignty over this object and others like it.161
1. The Limits of the Outer Space Treaty
The most significant space convention, the Outer Space
Treaty, lacks any explicit mention of property rights.162 It does
not, however, specifically reject individual or corporate property
in space.163 The treaty only prohibits “national appropriation” of
space by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation, or other

157. See id.
158. See id. at *2.
159 . 1011955 1999 RQ36 Earth Impact Risk Summary, NASA, http://neo.jpl.
nasa.gov/risk/a101955.html (last visited March 3, 2013) (describing the physical
properties of 1999 RQ36, including its orbital pattern).
160. See id.; UNOOSA, supra note 137 (describing COPUOS and its location in
Vienna).
161. See Earth Impact Risk Summary, supra note 159; UNOOSA, supra note 137;
supra notes 140–52 and accompanying text (describing COPUOS and its attempts to
prohibit private acquisitions of property through the Moon Agreement).
162. Compare Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, arts. I, II, VI, with Moon
Agreement, supra note 134, art. 11; see also Keefe, supra note 120, at 359 (explaining
that the Moon Agreement is more explicit than the Outer Space Treaty with regard to
barring ownership claims).
163. See Keefe, supra note 120, at 359 (explaining that the Moon Agreement is
more explicit than the Outer Space Treaty with regard to barring ownership claims).
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means.164 The drafters of the Outer Space Treaty chose to limit
this prohibition to nations, even though scholars at the
International Institute of Space Law had suggested that the
Treaty should prohibit “national and private appropriation.”165
While the governments that acceded to the Treaty clearly gave
up their own ability to claim space property for themselves, they
did not give up their citizens’ rights to acquire such property
privately. After all, human beings have a universal right to own
property.166 Reading a categorical rejection of property rights
into the treaty might contradict article 17 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees the personal
property right.167
As the Outer Space Treaty recognizes, no government on
this planet has sovereignty in space, which means that no
government may grant or deny resources in space to anyone.168
The Treaty does hold States Parties responsible for ensuring that
their citizens obey its provisions, which prevent individuals and
corporations from claiming property in space on behalf of their
governments. 169 It does not, however, prevent those same
persons from claiming property for themselves, because such a
claim would not violate the treaty’s prohibition on national
appropriation.170
The Outer Space Treaty uses the words “province of
mankind” to describe space, but this language does not mean
164 . See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. II (prohibiting national
appropriation).
165. See Int’l Inst. of Space Law, Draft Resolution of the International Institute of
Space Law Concerning the Legal Status of Celestial Bodies, in Proceedings, 40th
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
351 (1965).
166. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3/217(III), art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of
Human Rights] (guaranteeing an individual’s right to own property); Keefe, supra note
120, at 359 (noting that “[t]he literalist approach [to Articles II and VI of the Outer
Space Treaty] is not popular because it is not always compatible with the intent behind
the words found in the treaty at the time of drafting”).
167. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 166, art. 17; Keefe,
supra note 120, at 359.
168 . See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. II (prohibiting claims of
sovereignty).
169 . See id. art. VI (holding States Parties responsible for their citizens’
compliance with the Outer Space Treaty).
170. See id. art. II (prohibiting national appropriation).
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that mankind owns space collectively. 171 The drafters of the
Outer Space Treaty understood the “province” language to
connote celestial bodies’ availability for use by all states on
Earth, not joint ownership.172 The distinction between common
use and joint ownership reflects philosopher John Locke’s
articulation of communal and personal property on Earth:
Though the Earth . . . be common to all men, yet every man
has a Property in his own Person. . . . Whatsoever then he
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left
it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joyned to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
Property.173

The Outer Space Treaty’s admonishment that explorers
avoid “harmful contamination” of celestial bodies could amount
to an assertion of sovereignty over those bodies.174 However,
reading this modestly worded warning in context indicates that
the Treaty only asserted jurisdiction over explorers, and not
sovereignty over celestial bodies and their resources. 175 The
article in which the environmental language appears, article IX,
encourages cooperation and mutual assistance, and asks States
Parties to act with due regard for each others’ interests.176 It goes
on to discourage States Parties from interfering with each other,
indicating that the “contamination” ban is meant to protect
astronauts, not space rocks.177
The arguments in this section have asserted that no
international sovereignty over celestial bodies arises from the
Outer Space Treaty. Even if such sovereignty did exist, it is not
clear that it would apply to asteroids. The term “celestial body”

171. See Zullo, supra note 118, at 2419 ((quoting U.S.S.R. Working Paper, Annex
I, at 24–25, UN Doc. A/AC.105/115 (Mar. 28, 1973) [hereinafter U.S.S.R. Working
Paper])) (describing the “province of all mankind” language as meaning that space
resources are subject to “the undivided and common use of all states on Earth . . . not
joint [ownership] by them.”).
172. See id.
173. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305–06 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed., 1967) (1690).
174. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. IX (admonishing explorers to
avoid harmful contamination of celestial bodies).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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has no firm legal definition.178 It is not certain whether “celestial
body” applies to all natural objects (including asteroids) or only
to planets. 179 Planets, after all, are somewhat arbitrarily
distinguished from asteroids by their size.180 The Outer Space
Treaty and its provisions might therefore apply to Earth’s Moon
and the named planets of the solar system, or to the moons
circling those planets, or to any rock in space.181
2. The Failure of the Moon Agreement
COPUOS apparently conceded its inability to prevent the
commercial use of space resources when, in 1976, the
Committee refused to adopt an Italian proposal that would have
prohibited the collection of celestial samples for economic
profit.182 COPUOS later recommended the Moon Agreement,
which attempted to lay the foundation for international
sovereignty in space. 183 The Moon Agreement, however, is
neither positive nor customary international law. 184 Only
thirteen nations have ratified the Agreement, and none of them
are independently space-competent.185 Ironically, the Union of
178. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 175 n.2 (explaining that “celestial body”
is not defined).
179. See id.
180. See Resolution B5: Definition of a Planet in the Solar System, INT’L ASTRONOMICAL
UNION (2006), available at http://www.iau.org/static/resolutions/Resolution_GA26-56.pdf (defining a planet as a body in orbit around the Sun, with sufficient mass for its
self-gravity to overcome rigid body forces so that it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium
(nearly round) shape, and that has cleared the neighborhood of other bodies around
its orbit).
181. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 175 n.2 (explaining that “celestial body”
is not defined).
182. Report of the Legal Subcommittee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on
the Work of its Fifteenth Session, U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/171 (May 28, 1976) (refusing to
adopt an Italian proposal that would prohibit the return of scientific samples).
183. See Moon Agreement supra note 134, arts. 6, 7, 9, & 11 (establishing the
foundation for a UN regime that would exercise sovereignty over resources in space).
184. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178; Standing Committee on the Status
of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, Annual Report, INT’L
INST. SPACE L. OF THE INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL FED’N 6, 16 (2002), available at
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/2002_StandingCommittee.pdf (recording that the only
States Parties to the Moon Agreement are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile,
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, and Uruguay).
185. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178; Standing Committee on the Status
of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, supra note 184, at 6,
16.
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Soviet Socialist Republics staunchly opposed the Moon
Agreement and its collectivist ideals, and the Russian Federation
has done so as well.186 In the United States, a Congressional
committee report listed the Agreement’s risks to property rights
among the reasons not to ratify it.187 The committee asserted, as
did other nations’ governments, that the property provisions of
the Moon Agreement would discourage private investment in
the space industry.188
3. US Enterprises
As noted above, the US government has not established a
firm stance on the issue of property rights in space. Congress has
encouraged commercial space activity through measures such as
the 2010 National and Commercial Space Programs Law, which
requires that NASA facilitate space commerce.189 On the other
hand, State Department official Braibanti’s letter to Gregory
Nemitz, which broadly rejected property rights in space, took
exactly the position that the US Congress refused to adopt when
it turned down the Moon Agreement.190
In the Nevada District Court, which turned down his
property claim, Gregory Nemitz explicitly declined to request a
declaratory judgment regarding his ownership interest in 433
Eros.191 Therefore, the court’s subsequent reasoning regarding
the possibility of claiming property rights in space is probably
186. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178; Standing Committee on the Status
of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, supra note 184, at 6,
16; see also Gangale, supra note 78, at 70 (describing Soviet resistance to the Moon
Agreement and its common heritage language).
187. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 152, at 465–66 (expressing
concern about “common heritage” property rights).
188. See id. at 465–66; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 195–96 (listing
concerns that the Moon Agreement would discourage space commerce).
189. National and Commercial Space Programs, 51 U.S.C. § 20102(c) (2012)
(encouraging commerce in space).
190. Compare Braibanti letter, supra note 160, with SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 183 (illustrating discord between the State Department’s assertion that the
Outer Space Treaty precluded property rights, and Conress’s rejection of the Moon
Agreement due to its denigration of property rights in space).
191 . See Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL
3167042 at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. Nat’l Aeronautics &
Space Admin. 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that Nemitz had expressly
disclaimed interest in a declaratory judgment regarding his ownership interest, and
holding that he had thus failed to make a cognizable claim).
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non-binding dicta. 192 Even if it were not dicta, the court’s
reasoning is still quite limited. It only addresses whether
Nemitz’s cited amendments, statutes, and treaties created his
right to own the property that he claimed—not whether a
general right to own property in space exists.193
III. SLIPPING THE SURLY BONDS OF SOVEREIGNTY
The preceding Parts have reviewed the history of discovery
law on Earth and considered what principles might apply to
resources in space. Acquiring celestial property may be as simple
as making the first claim, or the United Nations may complicate
the process by asserting sovereignty over space resources. Part
III.A of this Note explains why UN sovereignty over celestial
resources is inappropriate. This first subpart discusses the failure
of the common heritage principle, the troubling implications of
extraterrestrial sovereignty, and the distinction between
environmental interests on Earth and in space. Part III.B shows
how private space explorers can create a celestial mining
industry without UN sovereignty. This portion of the Note
points to aboriginal title as a precedent for establishing claims
without a sovereign’s authority, and discusses the benefits that a
first-claimant regime could have for mankind as a whole,
including developing nations.
A. “Take Them”
Someday, perhaps in 2025, a prospecting spacecraft will
leave Earth on a mission to recover valuable resources from
space.194 As the prospector approaches its target, the United
Nations or one of its subsidiaries may assert sovereignty over the
target after deciding, with an eye toward the Moon Agreement,
that resource exploitation in space is about to become
192. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 227 (2013) (describing dicta as reasoning not necessary to
the decision of the case, which is generally not binding).
193. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1–2 (holding that Nemitz had failed to
establish that the Ninth and Tenth Amendment “provide” a claim for denial of
property rights, that 42 U.S.C. § 2451 “establishe[d]” legal basis for his claim, and that
the rejection of the Moon Agreement or the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty
“created” any right to acquire property in an asteroid).
194. See BROPHY ET AL., supra note 11, at 5 (estimating that it will be possible to
capture an asteroid by 2025).
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feasible.195 Such an assertion would call to mind the arrogance
of Gregory Nemitz, pointing at a light in the sky and saying
“That’s mine,” as someone else’s spacecraft struggled toward
it.196 Perhaps the United Nations will attempt to allocate regions
of space to certain member states for exploration, just as the
Papacy once assigned areas of the New World to European
kingdoms.197 If the first prospector acquires its target asteroid
and collects its resources, the United Nations may attempt to
capitalize on the prospector’s work, just as Nemitz demanded
US$0.20 per year from NASA for parking and storage of its
probe. 198 The United Nations might try to establish an
organization like the ISA or its planned-for “Enterprise,” and
use prospectors’ technology, funds, and exploratory findings to
acquire space resources for the United Nations itself.199 For the
reasons set forth below, the United Nations would lack sufficient
basis in international law and public policy to support any of the
actions described above.
The United Nations, or one of its subsidiaries, cannot
establish that an asteroid and its resources are the common
heritage of mankind because the “common heritage” principle
is not a true international norm.200 The common heritage idea
enjoys dubious authority under UNCLOS, and it has no
standing in outer space after the failure of the Moon
Agreement. 201 The common heritage principle, whatever it
means, binds neither private space explorers nor the nations

195. See Moon Agreement, supra note 134, art. 11, para. 5 (requiring States Parties
to establish a space-governance regime as soon as resource exploitation is about to
become feasible).
196. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1 (describing how Nemitz attempted to
claim 433 Eros just before NASA’s probe reached it).
197. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text (describing how the Papacy
asserted dominion over the entire world and granted certain monarchs the right to
explore specified areas through instruments like the Bull Inter Caetera).
198. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1 (describing how Nemitz demanded
US$0.20 per year for parking and storage of the NEAR Shoemaker probe).
199. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (describing the ISA and
Enterprise’s planned redistribution of resources under UNCLOS).
200. See supra note 88 (describing how only some developed nations acceded to
UNCLOS, and only after the 1994 Protocol reduced the ISA’s power to distribute
resources); supra notes 187–191 (describing how the Moon Agreement is not
international law specifically because of objections to the common heritage problem).
201. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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that host them, except perhaps the thirteen States Parties to the
Moon Agreement.202
With the legal failure of the common heritage principle
established, it is useful to examine the policy implications of
extraterrestrial sovereignty. European monarchs and the Vatican
asserted a similar power, extraterritorial sovereignty, over
foreign lands on Earth in order to maintain peace among
explorers, promote the spread of their values, and increase their
wealth and power.203 The grave consequences of extraterritorial
sovereignty throughout the Age of Exploration reveal the
dangers of this concept.204 Through the Moon Agreement, the
United Nations attempted to lay the foundation for its own
extraterrestrial sovereignty over all asteroids, and every other
celestial body in the solar system, even though no one on Earth
had touched or even seen the majority of these objects. 205
Extraterrestrial sovereignty is even more absurd because the
Moon Agreement has failed, and the Outer Space Treaty, which
enjoys more support, does not limit its own provisions to Earth’s
solar system. 206 If the Outer Space Treaty is read to have
established UN sovereignty in space, it would make that
organization the master of all bodies outside of Earth’s
atmosphere. 207 When one considers the vast multitude of
celestial bodies in Earth’s solar system, and further notes that
there are probably more than one hundred billion stars in our
galaxy, plus untold millions of other galaxies in the universe,
such a claim is breathtakingly arrogant.208
202. See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text (describing the few nations
that have ratified the Moon Agreement).
203. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text (describing the causes and
consequences of European extraterritorial sovereignty).
204. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (describing the dangers of
extraterritorial sovereignty).
205. See NASA to Launch New Science Mission to Asteroid in 2016, NASA (May 25,
2011), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/solarsystem/features/osiris-rex.html (describing
the lack of human contact with asteroids); see also supra notes 134–45 and
accompanying text (describing how the Moon Agreement attempted to establish UN
control over space resources).
206 . See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118 (lacking language limiting its
provisions to Earth’s solar system).
207. See id.
208. See How Many Stars Are There in the Universe?, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Feb. 23,
2004), http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/How_many_stars_are_there_
in_the_Universe [hereinafter ESA] (describing the estimated number of stars and
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The United Nations may cite environmental reasons for
exercising sovereignty in space, but environmental interests are
not the same in space as they are on Earth. There is little if any
support in law or policy for the preservation of asteroids’ natural
environments. 209 An incident on July 19, 2009, reveals the
difference between the environmental interest on Earth and in
space.210 That day, a large celestial body (between 80 and 160
kilometers in diameter) slammed into the surface of Jupiter at
ninety-nine kilometers per second.211 This was an event of some
significance for that asteroid or comet, which exploded in a
fireball one thousand times more powerful than the asteroid
explosion over Tunguska, Siberia, in 1908. 212 The Tunguska
blast drew immediate concern in countries as far away as
England, where its shock wave rattled scientific instruments.213
However, on the day after astronomers observed Jupiter’s 2009
explosion, the New York Times led with an article about ESPN’s
efforts to corner the market on local sports stories.214 Five days
later, when the Times finally reported the celestial body’s
destruction, it pointed out Jupiter’s useful role in Earth’s solar
system as a strong-gravity planet, which draws objects to crash
into itself and thereby protects Earth from “space junk.”215 This
“space junk” is exactly the sort of material that an

galaxies in the universe as of 2004); see also Andrew Moseman, The Estimated Number of
Stars in the Universe Just Tripled, DISCOVER (Dec. 1, 2010), http://blogs.
discovermagazine.com/80beats/2010/12/01/the-estimated-number-of-stars-in-theuniverse-just-tripled/#.UPx3XqFU6Ic (summarizing the findings of a Yale astronomy
study that indicated previous star population estimates were too low).
209. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text (describing the Outer Space
Treaty’s apparent assertion of jurisdiction over explorers rather than sovereignty over
space resources in its environmental provisions).
210. See Mystery Impact Leaves Earth-Size Mark on Jupiter, CNN (July 21, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/space/07/21/jupiter.nasa.meteor.scar/index.htm;
see also Hubble Space Telescope Captures Rare Jupiter Collision, NASA (July 24, 2009),
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/hubble/main/jupiter-hubble.html
(describing
the impact on Jupiter).
211. See CNN, supra note 210; NASA, supra note 210.
212. See CNN, supra note 210; NASA, supra note 210.
213. See CNN, supra note 210; NASA, supra note 210.
214. See Brooks Barnes, Across U.S., ESPN Aims to Be the Home Team, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
20 2009, at A1 (describing the sports network’s attempts to appeal to local audiences).
215. See Dennis Overbye, Jupiter: Our Cosmic Protector?, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2009, at
WK7 (describing how Jupiter protects other planets from dangerous celestial bodies by
drawing those objects to collide with itself).
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environmental regime in space would attempt to preserve.216
Left untouched by mankind, the only effect these bodies could
have on Earth would be to eventually collide with this planet and
kill large quantities of its life forms.217
The distinction between environmental interests on Earth
and in space also depends on the importance of sustainability.
In a 2012 report, COPUOS expressed the view of some members
that space resources should be developed in a “sustainable”
manner.218 Sustainability is a significant concern on Earth, where
resources are finite. 219 Resources in outer space, however,
comfortably exceed the practical reach of human
consumption.220 For instance, a modest-sized metallic asteroid
may contain more platinum group metals than have been mined
on Earth in human history.221 As noted above, there are far more
than 500,000 asteroids of various types in this solar system
alone.222 Every gram of platinum, silicon, or water consumed in

216 . See, e.g., Moon Agreement supra note 134, art. 7 (providing for the
preservation of environments in space).
217. See generally Peter Schulte et al., The Chicxulub Asteroid Impact and Mass
Extinction at the Cretaceous-Paleogene Boundary, 327 SCIENCE 1214 (2010); Maureen
Oakes, Modeling an Asteroid Impact, LOS ALAMOS NAT’L LAB., http://www.lanl.gov/
quarterly/q_spring03/asteroid_text.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how
the asteroid that struck Earth at what is now called the Chicxulub crater in Mexico
probably caused the extinction of the dinosaurs as well as seventy percent of life on this
planet).
218. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 55th Sess., GAOR 67th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, 9 (June 15, 2012) (noting some members’ advocacy for sustainable
development of the outer space environment and its resources).
219 . See, e.g., Millenium Development Goals, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, http://
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview.html (last viewed Mar. 29,
2013) (listing “[e]nsure environmental sustainability” as their eighth goal).
220 . How Big Is Our Universe?, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/audience/
foreducators/5-8/features/F_How_Big_is_Our_Universe.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2013) (describing space objects 14 billion light years away from Earth).
221. See ROSS, supra note 4, at 6 (explaining that a modestly-sized (1 kilometer)
metallic asteroid would probably contain more platinum group metals than are
available on Earth).
222. See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1 (asserting that there are more than 500,000
known asteroids in the solar system, and probably many more yet to be discovered); see
also ESA, supra note 208 (describing hundreds of millions of stars in the Milky Way
galaxy, and millions of galaxies in the universe).
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space would leave untapped a more precious gram from Earth’s
limited resources.223
Even if international law were somehow construed to
prohibit claims of private property over territory on celestial
bodies, it would still not prohibit the acquisition and use of
resources from those bodies.224 The first article of the Outer
Space Treaty guarantees the right to use celestial bodies. 225
Representatives of the United States and Soviet Union made
uncontested statements at the time of the Treaty’s passage that
the term “use” includes the rights to acquire and possess
resources from celestial bodies.226 As international law scholar
(and aerospace engineer) Thomas Gangale put it, “If you want
resources on Mars or the Moon, take them.”227
B. Escape Velocity
The first asteroid prospectors will probably launch
spacecraft from the territory of some nation on Earth.228 Just as
persons and corporations on Earth are subject to the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of their home governments when
they engage in certain activities overseas, space prospectors will
fall under the extraterrestrial jurisdiction of their launching
states.229 When governments exercise extraterrestrial jurisdiction
over their nationals in space, they can protect Earth and its

223. See Stewart B. Whitney, Space Political Economy: Integrating Technology and
Social Science for the 1990s, Third Annual Space Development Conference (April
1990) (describing the environmental interest in developing space to preserve Earth).
224. See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 43 (arguing that individuals cannot acquire
real property rights in space, but they may acquire and use space resources).
225. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. I (guaranteeing the right to use
celestial bodies).
226. See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 43.
227. See id.
228. Hypothetically, prospectors may also construct spacecraft in orbit, or they
may use ocean launch-pads outside any nation’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., About Sea Launch,
SEA LAUNCH, http://www.sea-launch.com/about.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2012); Sea
Launch and Land Launch Projects, ENERGIA, http://www.energia.ru/en/launchers/
launchers.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (describing a sea-based floating commercial
launch pad).
229. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. VIII (recognizing States Parties’
jurisdiction over objects launched from their territories).
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citizens from the negative impacts of asteroid mining. 230
However, just as extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot justly extend
a government’s sovereign territory onto foreign lands, an Earth
government’s extraterrestrial jurisdiction cannot extend that
government’s sovereignty over space territory and resources.231
Any Earth government, including the United Nations, may take
measures within its authority to ensure that space prospectors
not crash asteroids into Earth or poison this planet with alien
microbes.232 Earth governments may also intervene to prevent
prospectors from harming each other. 233 However, no
government can declare any territory or resources in space to be
under its dominion.234 Space prospectors may therefore acquire
space territory and its resources as first claimants and
continuous users.235 Just as aboriginal title allowed societies on
Earth to assert ownership of the territory they used regardless of
whether some government granted them title, the first
prospectors can rightfully claim any resources they use without
asking the United Nations for permission.236
230. See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. IX (requiring States Parties
to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s environment through the introduction of
extraterrestrial material).
231. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1964)
(holding that extraterritorial jurisdiction does not grant US courts the authority to rule
upon a foreign sovereign’s public acts within that foreign sovereign’s territory).
232. See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. IX (requiring States Parties
to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s environment through the introduction of
extraterrestrial material).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 606–07 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(holding that states exercise jurisdiction over their nationals’ conduct outside their
territory through the “nationality principle,” and also holding that states have criminal
jurisdiction to proscribe conduct by foreign nationals occurring outside of their own
territory if the conduct has a substantial effect within their territory under the “effects
principle,” or if the conduct is directed against a critical state interest under the
“protective principle” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 402(1)–(2) (1986); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437
(1932); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003)).
234. See Zullo, supra note 118, at 2419 (describing the “province of all mankind”
language as meaning that space resources are subject to “the undivided and common
use of all states on Earth . . . not joint [ownership] by them.” (quoting U.S.S.R.
Working Paper, supra note 171 at 24–25)); see also Report of the Legal Subcommittee,
supra note 180 (refusing to adopt an Italian proposal that would prohibit the return of
scientific samples).
235. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (describing aboriginal title
requirements).
236. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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Proponents of UN sovereignty in space are correct that
property rights in the absence of sovereignty are less reassuring
than property rights under sovereign protection. 237 However,
this does not mean that such property rights have no value at all.
As stated above, a single asteroid could contain more platinum
group metals than have ever been mined on Earth, and there
are plenty of other precious resources on asteroids. 238
Competing prospectors would have more than half a million
asteroids from which to choose. 239 In the event that two
prospectors set their sights on the same exact asteroid, they
would have to resolve their differences without resorting to the
authority of an Earth government.240 Indigenous peoples all over
the Pacific enjoyed their lands for millennia without European
supervision, which should give us hope that the explorers and
residents of space will manage their affairs without a Bureau of
Extraterrestrial Land Management in Vienna.241 Governments
on Earth could discourage conflict by recording and publishing
explorers’ claims without recognizing them, just as the United
Nations does in its Law of the Sea Bulletin.242 Earth governments
could also discourage conflicts by exercising extraterrestrial
jurisdiction over victims and perpetrators of violence, just as
nations currently exert authority over their citizens and those
who would harm them in foreign lands or on the high seas.243
Ultimately, though, it will be up to the settlers of space to
establish the customs and relationships that maintain order in
237. See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 33–34 (asserting that property without
sovereignty is not practically useful without the protection of armed force).
238. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text (describing valuable resources in
asteroids).
239. See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1 (explaining that there are more than
500,000 known asteroids in Earth’s solar system).
240 . See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text (explaining that Earth
governments, including the United Nations, cannot extend their sovereignty to
territory or resources in space).
241 . See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (describing how Pacific
Islanders settled their lands and established a right of ownership later recognized as
aboriginal title).
242. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (describing how the United
Nations reduces the potential for conflict without recognizing deep seabed claims by
publishing them in the Law of the Sea Bulletin).
243. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (describing how governments may
use extraterritorial jurisdiction to prevent people in foreign territory from harming
each other).
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their interactions. When they do, they will become their own
sovereigns.244
It is fitting that the beneficiaries of space commerce include
societies that became their own sovereigns after exercising their
rights under aboriginal title. To see how, this Note returns to
the islands of the Kwajalein Atoll, where enterprising canoeists
once made their homes on land that belonged to no person
before. 245 The first inhabitants of those lands, when they
imagined the future, could not have predicted that they would
fall subject to centuries of colonial rule, nor that they would
emerge in the Twentieth Century as an independent nation
called the Republic of the Marshall Islands.246 Whatever they
thought about their future, those first pioneers could not have
conceived what would happen in the Kwajalein Atoll on
September 28, 2008.247 At 4:15 pm that day, a rocket blasted off a
launch pad surrounded by sand, palm trees, and turquoise blue
water.248 The rocket pushed a small spacecraft into the sky, and
quickly lifted it past the one-hundred-kilometer altitude
boundary between airspace and outer space.249 The spacecraft
then separated from its first stage rocket, fired its second stage,
and propelled itself into Earth’s orbit, where it will likely remain
until at least 2018. 250 The spacecraft, known as SpaceX
Corporation’s Falcon 1 Flight 4, became the first privately built
liquid fueled spacecraft to orbit the Earth.251
As Kwajalein’s example shows, private space activity can
benefit developing nations in a manner that satisfies the spirit of
the common heritage principal, if not the letter of the Moon
Agreement. Small nations like the Republic of the Marshall
Islands can provide commercial launch facilities for space
244. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “sovereign” as “a
person, body, or state vested with independent and supreme authority”).
245. See Hezel, supra note 39, at 3 (describing the settlement of the Marshall
Islands).
246. See Office of the President, Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 49
(describing the history of the Marshall Islands).
247. See SpaceX Falcon 1 Flight 4, Mission Summary in Pictures, SPACEX, http://
www.spacex.com/F1-004-summary.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing the
Falcon 1 Flight 4 mission).
248. See id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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businesses. 252 The United Nations, while frustrated in its
ambition to control the universe’s bounty, should take solace in
the knowledge that private enterprises can provide immediate
benefits for nations that cannot yet build their own space
vehicles.253
The Age of Exploration once again offers a useful analogy.
Some of Earth’s mightiest empires rose in small, resource-poor
lands that provided good ports for commercial shipping.254 In
the third millennium A.D., the proximity of many developing
nations to Earth’s equator makes them prime candidates for
launch pads, because Earth’s greater rotational speed at its
central latitudes would assist spacecraft in reaching escape
velocity.255 This accident of physics could give Somalia, Ecuador,
and Papau New Guinea the kind of opportunities that Great
Britain, the Netherlands, and Japan once enjoyed.256
As a would-be prospector, you might wonder whether the
United States will support your business. That remains to be
seen. 257 Instead of concerning yourself with COPUOS
proceedings in Vienna, you might lobby Congress for a Deep
Space Hard Mineral Resources Act, similar to the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act, which guarantees American
252. See Sea Launch, supra note 230 (describing a floating ship-based commercial
launch pad that can bring commercial space activity to any nation that wishes to host
it).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE UNITED PROVINCES
OF THE NETHERLANDS 210–11 (1705) (“Nor has Holland grown rich by any Native
Commodities, but by force of Indu[s]try; by Improvement and Manufacture of all
Foreign Growths; and by being the general Magazine of Europe, and furni[s]hing all
Parts with whatever the Market wants or invites; and by their Sea-men, being, as they
have properly been call’d, the common Carriers of the World.”); ADAM ANDERSON, 1
AN HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL DEDUCTION OF THE ORIGINS OF COMMERCE
preface, v (1763) (“To the instrumentality of commerce alone, the Britannic Empire is,
mo[s]t peculiarly, indebted for its opulence and grandeur; its improvement in arts and
knowledge; and, in general, for the great bulk of its [s]olid comforts and
conveniences.”).
255. A Saturn Launch Site, NASA, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/pao/History/SP-4204/
ch1-2.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how early NASA launch planners
sought to take advantage of equatorial launch sites because of the Earth’s faster
rotational velocity at the equator).
256. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ATLAS 2 (Rand McNally 1994 ed. 1969) (depicting
Somalia, Ecuador, and Papau New Guinea as nations lying on or near Earth’s equator).
257. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text (describing varying US actions
regarding property rights in space).
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companies’ right to acquire deep seabed resources. 258 If
Congress is not interested, you might take your business to a
nation like Russia, whose law explicitly recognizes the property
rights of space explorers.259
CONCLUSION
Governments on Earth, like the European monarchs who
sponsored ancient conquests, monopolized space exploration
until very recently.260 As opportunities for space travel grow and
multiply through private industry, and as people and enterprises
move into space in greater numbers and at greater distances, the
residents of space will constitute wholly new societies, with their
own interests, communication, and culture.261 Earth’s authorities
should expect that as these pioneers develop the ability to
support and govern themselves, they will grow restless of the
political bonds which connected them with their old world.262
When that day comes, the governments of Earth will find that
this planet has no more right to those celestial bodies than the

258. See Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473
(2012).
259. See Russian Federation, 1993, Law of the Russian Federation on Space
Activity (June 20, 1993), art. 16 para. 4, available at http://www.jaxa.jp/library/
space_law/chapter_4/4-1-2-7/4-1-2-73_e.html (“The property rights over the physical
product created in outer space shall belong to the organizations and citizens possessing
property rights in the components of space technics”).
260. Will Oremus, Deep Space Mine, SLATE (May 11, 2012), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/future_tense/2012/05/asteroid_mining_the_crazy_awesome_
plan_to_grab_platinum_from_outer_space_.html (describing how the first participants
in the “space race” were governments, particularly the United States and what is now
Russia).
261. See, generally JOSHUA KENDALL, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDING FATHER: NOAH
WEBSTER’S OBSESSION AND THE CREATION OF AN AMERICAN CULTURE (2011)
(describing how America’s unique culture and status as a independent polity arose in
part from its development of unique means of communication).
262 . See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration of Independence: A 225th
Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REV. 701, 728–37 (2001) (noting the
conspicuous repetition of “We” in the Declaration of Independence, and concluding
that the Declaration symbolized the existence of a single American people as distinct
from Britain, which the former colonists now considered an alien nation); PETER
AUGUSTINE LAWLER, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE ON THE ORIGIN AND PERPETUATION OF
HUMAN LIBERTY 14 (1993) (describing one of Tocqueville’s most celebrated
contributions to political science as the “revolution of rising expectations”).
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monarchs of Europe could claim over Kwajalein.263 It will then
be clear, if it is not already, that those celestial bodies are not
the common heritage of people in Vienna, New York, or
Moscow.264 Those territories will be the common heritage of the
people who live there, the descendants of those who claimed
lands that belonged to no one before.265 It will be time to let
them go, so that they can assume among the powers of the
universe a separate and equal station.266
The rest is just rocket science.

263. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (describing the disastrous
effects of extraterritorial sovereignty). It might seem bizarre in modern times to expect
that extraterrestrial sovereignty would bring back old colonial evils like mercantilism
and the Spanish Inquisition. See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 113 (arguing that
opponents of the Moon Agreement are wrong to block its ratification due to some
“trepidation over the shape of things to come”). But see supra notes 90–93 and
accompanying text (describing how the drafters of UNCLOS attempted to create the
Enterprise, a neo-mercantilist UN mining company). See generally MONTY PYTHON’S
FLYING CIRCUS: The Spanish Inquisition (BBC television broadcast Sep. 22, 1970)
(“Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition.”).
264. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the
Moon Agreement and its common heritage principle).
265. See supra notes 230–37 and accompanying text (describing how asteroid
prospectors can claim celestial bodies in accordance with the principle of aboriginal
title).
266. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776).

